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INTRODUCTION

There are many ethical considerations when engaging in patent litigation.
One common area of concern is conflicts of interest. These can arise at
any stage of a patent litigation and, if not avoided, can have major consequences both for the firm and the client involved in the conflict.
To understand what conflicts to avoid, this Article looks at recent
decisions in patent litigation cases where conflict of interest issues have
been decided. The discussion is divided up as follows. In Part I, choice of
law regarding conflicts issues is discussed. In Part II, the common issues
surrounding attorney and/or firm disqualifications for conflicts of interest
are explored. Part III looks at conflicts of interest involving current
clients. Part IV examines conflicts of interest concerning former clients.
In Part V, a different type of conflict of interest—the lawyer as a witness
situation—is discussed. Part VI moves to conflicts of interests involving
non-lawyers—specifically judges, experts, and courtroom interpreters.
Finally, in Part VII, the possible remedies a court may award for such
conflicts are reviewed.
I.

CHOICE OF LAW

The Federal Circuit has determined that conflict of interest issues, even if
arising in patent litigation, is governed by regional circuit law. In Uniloc
USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the court applied First Circuit law to determine whether a judge must recuse himself due a conflict of interest.1 The
same occurred in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Med. Prosthetics Res.
Assocs., Inc., where Ninth Circuit law was applied to a law firm disqualification motion based on an alleged conflict of interest.2
The Federal Circuit will even follow the regional circuit’s law on
when an order disqualifying counsel is appealable. In W.L. Gore, the
court considered an immediate appeal from such an order because “the
Ninth Circuit permits the immediate review of the grant of a motion to
disqualify counsel.”3
Notably, while prior decisions in this area are not binding on the
regional circuit or the Federal Circuit, they do influence future Federal
Circuit cases on the issue. In W.L. Gore, the Federal Circuit was considering whether a conflict of interest personal to a firm’s attorney could
1.
2.
3.

290 Fed. Appx. 337, 340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
745 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
W.L. Gore, 745 F.2d at 1465 (citing Gough v. Perkowski, 694 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir.
1982)).

3

521

be imputed to the whole firm.4 The defense was that the firm had properly screened off the attorney from the rest of the firm regarding the matter. The Federal Circuit noted the “Ninth Circuit has expressly left open
the question of whether firmwide disqualification would be necessary if
screening procedures were used.”5
However, the Federal Circuit had considered whether such a defense
could avoid imputing a conflict before under Seventh Circuit law.6 The
Federal Circuit was eventually able to avoid speaking first for the Ninth
Circuit on the validity of this defense.7 Still, the Federal Circuit is clearly
influenced by its prior decisions on a particular subject matter, even if
these were made under regional circuit law.
II.

FOUNDATION FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST REGARDING
ATTORNEYS/FIRM

A. Standard When Determining Attorney/Firm
Disqualification Based on Conflict

The party bringing a motion to disqualify bears the burden of
providing the grounds for such disqualification.8 District courts have
broad discretion to determine whether to disqualify counsel.9
In general, disqualification is a “harsh sanction” and should “be
resorted to sparingly.”10 Such motions interfere with the non-moving
party’s right to freely choose his or her own counsel.11 Further, such
motions often are interposed for tactical reasons and inevitably cause
delay12. Accordingly, some circuits have directed that courts faced
with disqualification motions take a “restrained approach that focuses
primarily on preserving the integrity of the trial process.”13 A party
seeking disqualification carries a heavy burden of proof and must

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1466-67.
Id. at 1467 n.6.
Id. at 1466 (Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1984))
The court decided that the attorney had not been walled off and thus the rebuttable
could not be established. Id.
FMC Tech., Inc. v. Edwards, 420 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
Intelli-check, Inc. v. Trico Card Techs., 2008 WL 4682433 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,
2008) (citing Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Norton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983).
DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F.Supp.2d 159, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980).
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demonstrate that, absent disqualification, the trial would be tainted.14
Moreover, courts considering disqualification must closely examine
the facts of the case and balance a party’s right to counsel of choice
against the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession.15
However, it is also “axiomatic that an attorney must avoid even
the appearance of a conflict of interest.”16 Courts need to preserve the
“public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.”17
B. Determining Who is a Client

Before a conflict of interest based on representation can be
established, there must be actual representation. An attorney-client
relationship needs to be identified.
1.

Preliminary Interviews

In Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu, the court considered a
motion to disqualify the alleged infringer’s counsel based on a
conflict of interest. 18 The allegation was based on an interview
between Laryngeal and the firm as possible counsel in the very
patent infringement suit at bar.
The central questions were whether the preliminary interview
created an attorney-client relationship and/or “whether confidences
were disclosed or legal advice was given that would disqualify [the
firm] from this action.”
The court noted that a fiduciary obligation can exist in the
early stages of a relationship between attorney and client.19 It can
even arise out of a “preliminary consultations by a prospective
client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employment does not result.”20 “When a party seeking legal advice consults an attorney at law and secures that advice, the relation of

14. Evans, 715 F.2d at 791.
15. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 228-29 (2d Cir.
1977).
16. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1144-47,
(1999).
18. 2008 WL 558561 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008).
19. Id. at *1-2.
20. Id. at *3 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir.1978)).
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attorney and client is established prima facie. [citations omitted].
The primary concern is whether and to what extent the attorney
acquired confidential information.”21 The focus is on whether the
meeting went beyond “initial or peripheral contacts.”22
The court found that, during the preliminary meeting, “an
implied attorney-client relationship was formed.”23 The stated purpose of the meeting was to determine if the firm was interested in
and qualified to represent Laryngeal against Ambu. Laryngeal
brought documents and sample products to explain the case to the
lawyers, and these documents included confidential notes. Laryngeal also “revealed confidential information concerning the subjects of venue, claim construction in relation to the theory of their
case, and settlement, and that the [firm] lawyers provided strategic
legal advice about how to proceed on those topics.” The meeting
lasted over one hour. The court concluded that “the setting was
appropriate and conducive to establishing an attorney-client relationship and that the clear intent was to keep the communications
private.”24
The attorneys were thus disqualified.25
2.

Joint Defense Arrangements

Joint defense agreements have become more and more common as multiple, unrelated companies are being sued on a single.
The defendants, in order to share resources, commonly enter into
joint defense agreements. A question can arise as to whether a
firm’s representation of one of the joint defendants can be considered a representation of all of the joint defendants.
Such a situation arose in In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation.26
In that case, two attorneys of the firm who was representing the
patentee had been part of a joint defense agreement to which a
number of defendants were parties. The two attorneys did not
directly represent any of the defendants in the previous suit. The
attorneys were also members of a different firm at the time of the
joint defense agreement.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at *3.
Id. at *3-4.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id.
432 F. Supp. 2d 461 (D. N.J. 2006).
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Some of the defendants in the current action moved to disqualify the firm based on these two attorneys involvement in the prior
joint defense agreement. The court agreed, finding that the joint
defense agreement “created a fiduciary and implied attorney-client
relationship between [the attorneys] and the other [] Defendants.27
As members of the joint defense team, [the attorneys] received
confidential information from co-[]Defendants.”28
III.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST BASED ON CURRENT CLIENT

All jurisdictions have professional rules of responsibility that include a
rule governing conflicts of interest with current clients. Virginia’s rule on
this topic, Rule 1.7, is set forth below:
(a)

(b)

1.

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another existing client, unless:
(1)

the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and

(2)

each client consents after consultation.

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless:
(1)

the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and

(2)

the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved.”29

Representation of Related Entity

A common question in patent infringement cases is whether a
firm represents an entity related to an adverse party in such a manner
as to create a conflict. These situations present two questions—
(1) whether the entities are related enough to consider the adverse
party a current client and (2) whether this representation renders the
firm directly adverse to the opposing party.

27. Id. at 463.
28. Id.
29. Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7.

7
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The court in Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Philips Lumileds Lighting
Co., was presented with this very issue. 30 In Honeywell, Philips
Lumileds sought to disqualify Honeywell’s counsel (the “Firm”) based
on a conflict of interest. Philips Lumileds asserted that the Firm
represents Philips Electronics North American Corporation (“PENAC”)
in a variety of legal issues. Philips Lumileds noted that the Firm, in
representing PENAC, has represented numerous Philips entities including Philips Electronics, Philips Consumer Electronics, Philips Healthcare, and Philips Intellectual Property & Standards (Philips IP & S).31
And due to this representation, PHJW “had access to confidential
information, including its business plans, legal strategies, and intellectual property protection objectives” and contact with numerous
Philips executives.32
Honeywell, in response, conceded that PENCA is the Firm’s
current client, but that PENAC and Philips Lumileds “are attenuated
affiliates of one another,” not parent-sub and thus the Firm is not
adverse to a current client.33
The court applied ABA Model Rule 1.7 in determining whether
the Firm should be disqualified. The court concluded that Philips
Lumileds established both required factual findings under Rule 1.7—
“(1) that [Philips Lumileds] is a current client of the Firm; and
(2) that the Firm’s representation of Honeywell is directly adverse
to it.”34
The court first determined that the “circumstances are such
that the affiliate,” Philips Lumileds, “should be considered a client.”35
“[T]he fact of corporate affiliation, without more, does not make all
of the corporate affiliates a client of a specific lawyer or firm.” 36
However, circumstances, such as “(1) whether the corporation and
the subsidiary share a common legal department and management
duties, (2) whether the lawyer’s work for a parent corporation benefits a subsidiary, or (3) whether the lawyer’s work for the parent
involves collecting confidential information” are relevant to determining whether the affiliated company is considered a client.37
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

2009 WL 256831 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2009).
Id. at *1-2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2-3.
Id.
Id.
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Philips Lumileds shared the same legal department with PENAC
and the same “management, computer networks, and marketing
designs.”38 The Firm also, in its prior representations, had access to
confidential information on a number of Philips entities. There was
question as to how representation of PENAC impact Philips Lumileds.
But “an affiliate’s website ‘confirms the close family relationship of
the two companies, as well as their integrated business operations and
interests.’”39
The court next concluded that “[The Firm’s representation of
Honeywell is directly adverse.”40 Under the national ABA standard,
the question is not whether the matters are substantially related.
“Because Philips Lumileds is considered a client, [the Firm’s] representation is clearly adverse to it.”41 And the Firm had not obtained
consent of both clients—Philips Lumileds and Honeywell—to get the
conflict waived.42
The court, in closing, also looked at the balance the likelihood of
public suspicion against a party’s right to counsel of choice.”43 Here,
“[t]he subtle legal distinctions between all of its corporate affiliates
are transparent to the casual observer. The presence of a centralized
legal team, the current representation of PENAC as a client of the
Firm, and the high probability of disclosure of confidential information lead the Court to give great weight in favor of disqualifying the
Firm from the present suit.”44
IV.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITH FORMER CLIENTS

All jurisdictions have professional rules of responsibility that include a
rule governing conflicts of interest with former clients. Virginia’s rule on
this topic, Rule 1.9, is set forth below:
“(a)

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse

38. Id. at *3.
39. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Sony Corp., 2004 WL 2984297 (W.D.N.Y.
2004)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 1992)).
43. Id. (citing FDIC v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1314 (5th Cir.
1995)).
44. Id. at *4-5.
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to the interests of the former client unless both the present and former
client consent after consultation.
(b)

(c)

1.

A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer
formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1)

whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and

(2)

about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless both
the present and former client consent after consultation.

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter:
(1)

use information relating to or gained in the course of the
representation to the disadvantage of the former client except
as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to
a client, or when the information has become generally known;
or

(2)

reveal information relating to the representation except as
Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a
client.”45

“Substantially Related”

In Apeldyn Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Samsung moved to
disqualify Apeldyn’s counsel based on a conflict of interest.46 This
conflict was created by one of the firm’s lawyers having previously
represented Samsung while at a prior firm in an earlier litigation.47
The district court found a conflict.
The Attorney worked on a patent litigation matter for Samsung in
a previous case while at a prior firm.48 The Attorney was a partner at
this firm. The subject matter involved alleged infringement by specific
DRAM chips produced by Samsung.
Shortly after this litigation ended, Apeldyn’s firm began talking
to the Attorney while it was pursuing a different infringement case
against Samsung. The new firm determined that “there was no
conflict between the work that [the Attorney] had done previously for
Samsung and [the current firm’s] continued and current representation”

45.
46.
47.
48.

Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9.
693 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D. Del. 2010).
Id. at 401.
Id. at 401-02.
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adverse to Samsung.49 The Attorney was then hired and not ethical
screening was imposed to keep the Attorney away from patent
litigations adverse to Samsung.
The current firm then sued Samsung in this case on behalf of
Apeldyn.50 The Attorney was named as counsel for Apeldyn in the
case. The infringement case involved a “overdrive feature . . . implemented by two semiconductor components: the timing controller
integrated circuit (T-CON) and DRAM.”51
In determining Samsung’s motion to disqualify the Attorney and
the firm from representing Apeldyn, the court looked at Rule 1.9(a)
regarding conflict of interest and former clients. “Attorney conduct
will fall within the ambit of the Rule if, inter alia, “the present
client’s matter [is] the same as the matter the lawyer worked on for
the first client, or [is] a ‘substantially related’ matter . . . . .”52 “A
‘substantial relationship’ exists if the similarity between ‘the two
representations is enough to raise a common-sense inference that
what the lawyer learned from his former client will prove useful in
his representation of another client whose interests are adverse to
those of the former client.’”53
The court went on to find a “substantial relationship” between
the prior suit the Attorney worked on and the current suit. The court
concluded that there is a “substantial relationship” arises from the
“common-sense inference” that “Apeldyn will necessarily be using
specimens and documentation that are of the same type, if not the
same, as those collected and reviewed by [the Attorney] in the [prior]
litigation.”54
The court also noted that the firm did not get consent to waive the
conflict from Samsung.55
2.

Imputing the Conflict to the Entire Firm

In Intelli-Check, Inc. v. Tricom Card Techs., Inc., the court considered a motion to disqualify a firm based on one of its current

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403 (citing Nemours Foundation v. Gilbane, Aetna, Federal Ins. Co., 632 F.
Supp. 418, 422 (D. Del. 1986)).
53. Id. (citing Madukwe v. Del. State Univ., 552 F. Supp.2d 452, 458 (D. Del. 2008)).
54. Id. at 404-05.
55. Id. at 405-06.
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Associate’s work at a former firm.56 The court found that the conflict
could not be imputed to the firm.
The court applied New York Disciplinary Rule 5-108 that prohibits a lawyer from representing a client who is adverse to a former
client in the same matter except with consent from the former client
after full disclosure.57 The court noted that “[a] disqualifying conflict
exists when: (1) the moving party is a former client of the adverse
party’s counsel; (2) there is a substantial relationship between the
subject matter of the counsel’s prior representation of the moving
party and the issues in the present lawsuit; and (3) the attorney whose
disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to have had
access to, relevant privileged information in the course of his prior
representation of the client.”58
Here, the Associate’s conflict was not challenged. Instead the
focus was whether Associate’s new firm, who represented the alleged
infringer, should be imputed with this disqualification.59
“Ordinarily, if an attorney has a conflict with a client, the conflict
is imputed to the attorney’s entire firm.” 60 New York Disciplinary
Rule 5-105 provides that “[w]hile lawyers are associated in a law
firm, none of them shall knowingly accept or continue employment
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from
doing so under . . . [ (Disciplinary Rule 5-108) ] . . . except as otherwise provided therein.”61 There is a presumption that the confidences
and secrets of one attorney are either intentionally or inadvertently
disclosed to the whole firm. This presumption can be rebutted by
proper “ethical screens”.62
However, if the conflict attorney played an “appreciable role”
in the representing an adversary in the same matter, an ethical screen
may not avoid imputation.63 And here it appears the Associate played
such a role.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

2008 WL 468433 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008).
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. (citing Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 133
(2d Cir. 2005)).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1980)).
63. Id. at *4-5.
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The court focused on other factors that, it concluded, established
that such screening was effective.64 The court looked at the current
firm’s size (420 attorneys), its geographic and technological separation between the Associate and the litigation team, and evidence that
there had been no discussions between the Associate and the litigation team. 65 “The court’s confidence in the effectiveness of the
screen is further reinforced by the fact [the Associate] had separated
from his old firm almost two years before the conflict arose.”66 The
screen was also implemented immediately.
As a side note, the court also asked that the firm attorney who
represented both the Associate and the firm in this motion also be
screened from this litigation.67 The court was surprised that this was
not done as a matter of course given the circumstances.
Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu also deals with vicarious disqualification. In Laryngeal, the court considered a motion to disqualify
the alleged infringer’s firm based on a conflict of interest.68 The court
specifically imputed the conflict of two Attorneys, based on an preliminary interview, to the whole firm.
The court concluded that the conflict be imputed to the full firm
even though an “ethical wall around the two attorneys who met with
Plaintiffs” was erected.
While ethical screening can avoid imputation in California,69 the
facts here suggest that the screening will likely not work. Here, the
lawyers “are in the same District of Columbia office and the clients
are opponents in the same patent litigation.”70 “The risk of inadvertent disclosure of confidential information through casual conversation is too great and the appearance of divided loyalty is too strong to
make an exception on these facts.”71 This is particularly likely given
evidence that attorneys in this office “routinely seek informal advice
from colleagues.”72

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
2008 WL 558561 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008).
Id. at *7 (citing In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir.
2000)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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V.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BASED ON THE LAWYER AS
A WITNESS

Jurisdictions also have rules governing situations where a lawyer maybe
a witness. Virginia’s rule on this topic, Rule 3.7, is set forth below:
“(a)

A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in an adversarial proceeding in
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1)

the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2)

the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or

(3)

disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.

(b)

If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation,
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer may be called as a
witness other than on behalf of the client, the lawyer may continue the
representation until it is apparent that the testimony is or may be
prejudicial to the client.

(c)

A lawyer may act as advocate in an adversarial proceeding in which
another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as witness
unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 1.9.”73

This situation can arise in patent litigations in a number of settings.
Most revolve around the litigation counsel also being either the prosecution attorney for the underlying patent or opinion counsel for an alleged
infringer’s defense to a claim of willfulness. In both situations, the attorney is also a fact witness on issues of inequitable conduct, inventorship,
or willfulness. This can lead to Rule 3.7 issues and a conflict—with the
attorney both serving as advocate and as witness.
In Iguana, LLC v. Lanham, the court considered the patentee’s
motion to disqualify Lanham’s counsel on a variety of conflict of interest
grounds.74 One specific allegation was that a member of the representing
firm was a necessary witness to the action.
The court noted that disqualify based on an attorney being a witness,
Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 requires:
“(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to
be a necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or

73. Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7.
74. 628 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga 2008).
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(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b)

A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the
lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from
doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.”75

Here, the court found no violation of Rule 3.7. The attorney who was
potentially going to testify was not named counsel for Lanham.76 He was
a member of the same firm as named counsel, but Rule 3.7(b) does not
prohibit such a situation.77 Rule 3.7 “does not recognize imputed disqualification.”78 And there was no indication that there was any other conflict of interest with the firm representing Lanham in the present action.”
VI.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OF OTHERS

Conflicts can arise causing disqualifications of someone other than counsel
but still related to the litigation.
A. Judicial Conflict

In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit decided
Uniloc’s appeal of the denial of their motion “to recuse the district
court judge on the basis that an intern he had hired to assist with the
case allegedly had ties to Microsoft that would cause a reasonable
person to question the judge’s impartiality.” 79
Section 455(a) of title 28 of the United States Code provides that
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” 80 The court in Uniloc noted that “[t]he
key to the analysis is perception, not reality; a judge may be required
to be recused, even in the absence of an actual bias.”81 Applying circuit law, a judge must step down “only if the charge against her is
supported by a factual foundation and ‘the facts provide what an
objective, knowledgeable member of the public would find to be a

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1373-74.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
290 Fed. Appx. 337 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 340.
Id.
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reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality.’”82 The judge
is allowed a range of discretion, and the Federal Circuit focused
in Uniloc “whether the trial court’s decision can be defended as a
rational conclusion supported by a reasonable reading of the record.”83
Uniloc’s argument for recusal focused on the intern’s “financial
and contractual relationships” with the alleged infringer—Microsoft.84
The connections were “1) the receipt of royalty payments by Microsoft
Press pursuant to publishing contracts for four programming guides
co-authored by the intern and published 9-11 years ago; 2) the assignment of copyrights for his books to Microsoft; 3) a generic expression of thanks to certain Microsoft and Microsoft Press employees in
his books; 4) an expression of admiration for Microsoft products in
articles written and published by him in Microsoft journals; and 5)
indirect financing for his graduate studies from a Microsoft research
grant scheduled to expire before the start of his summer internship
with the district court.”85
The district court did not abuse its discretion for two reasons.
The Federal Circuit first noted that the recusal request focused on the
intern’s conflict of interest, not the district court judge’s.86 And “[t]he
intern’s connections to Microsoft do not create a conflict of interest
under the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees.”87 The Federal
Circuit also emphasized the finding that “the intern’s royalty payments
or the research funding that had been distributed completely before
the intern started his internship with the district court.”88
The Federal Circuit also made a distinction between the intern
and law clerks in influencing the district court judge. Law clerks could
be “capable of exerting substantial influence over the judges for whom
they work.”89 But this does not hold for interns, especially where in
this case “the district judge explicitly made that point in noting the
limited and indirect role that the intern would play in the court’s
decision-making in this case.”90

82. Id. (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (emphasis in
original)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 340-41.
87. Id. at 341.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Thus, “[u]nder these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in finding that no reasonable
member of the public could question his impartiality.”91
B. Expert Conflict

In Northbrook Digital LLC v. Vendio Servs., Inc., the court considered a motion to disqualify an expert in a patent litigation case
because of a conflict of interest.92 Northbrook had a single, initial consultation with a professor of computer science prior to the suit that
was then hired and put forth as an expert by the alleged infringers.
The standard for “disqualification of expert witnesses for a
conflict of interest” is a “two part test As this Court has recently
observed, there is a two part test: disqualification is proper where
(1) the moving party has an objectively reasonable expectation of a
confidential relationship with an expert and (2) that party disclosed
its privileged or confidential information to the expert.”93
Regarding the first part, the court concluded that there was no
reasonable expectation of a confidential relationship. The court looked
to a number of factors, including “whether the expert met once or
several times with the moving party; was formally retained or asked
to prepare a particular opinion; or was asked to execute a confidentiality agreement.”94 “[A] reasonable expectation of a confidential
relationship does not necessarily hinge on whether the expert executed
a formal retainer or confidentiality agreement.” But when the consultation is an initial one, “the party generally cannot claim a reasonable
expectation of a confidential relationship.”95
Here, there was only an initial interview with the expert—a
professor of computer science. And there was no written agreement
or informal letter regarding confidentiality.96 There was also no documentary evidence that confidential information was provided to the
expert by Northbrook. “This Court expects that, if there was

91. Id.
92. 2009 WL 5908005 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2009).
93. Id. at *1 (citing Carbomedics, Inc. v. ATS Medical, Inc., 2008 WL 5500760 at *3
(D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2008)).
94. Id. at *2 (citing Koch Refining Co., 85 F.3d at 1182; Stencel v. Fairchild Corp.,
174 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3
(D.D.C. 1991)).
95. 701 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
96. Id. at 862.
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significant concern about confidentiality, it would be reasonable for
counsel to make some effort to guard their disclosures.”97
C. Interpreter Conflict

The case of Advanced Tech. Incubator, Inc. v. Sharp Corp.,
involves another type of third party conflict.98 Here, the patentee challenged the use of a particularly interpreter by the alleged infringer
during trial. The patentee did not challenge the interpreter’s qualifications. Instead, the patentee alleged a “bias (or, at a minimum, the
appearance of bias).”
This potential bias was based on the fact that the interpreter had
acted, on several prior occasions as the alleged infringer’s “check
interpreter” during depositions. He also “provided interpreting services during attorney-client privileged communications between Sharp
witnesses and Sharp’s counsel in preparing for depositions. [The interpreter] also testified that he provided Japanese-language interpretation
in social settings where Sharp witnesses and Sharp’s counsel were
present. Sharp’s counsel has paid [the interpreter] at least $22,600 for
his services (not including expenses).”99 “In light of all of these facts
and circumstances, [the interpreter’s] service as a trial interpreter in
this case would raise an appearance of impropriety as to impartiality
and conflict of interest.” 100 Accordingly, the interpreter was
disqualified from interpreting at trial. Notably, this holding caused
the district court to continue the case and give the alleged infringer
“ample opportunity to obtain services of another trial interpreter.”101
VII. REMEDY CONSIDERATIONS

A crucial final question is what remedies are available for such conflicts
of interest. The common remedy is disqualification, which is discussed
in detail below. But other unique remedies have been fashioned before
when the conflicted counsel is not representing either party.

97.
8.
98.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 863.
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A. Disqualification of Counsel

On a motion for reconsideration, the district court in In re
Gabapentin Patent Litigation considered whether disqualification of
counsel was the correct remedy for a conflict of interest based on a
former client.102
The court noted that “[r]esolution of this issue requires a balancing of the hardship to the client whose lawyer is sought to be disqualified against the potential harm to the adversary should the attorney
be permitted to proceed. In addition, the Court must consider its obligation to preserve high professional standards and the integrity of the
proceedings.”103
The court determined that there was less harm to the conflicted
firm’s client then to the alleged infringer. The disqualification was
early in representation, with the disqualified firm having not “not
acquired much knowledge about the Gabapentin action because it has
not been active.”104 The court also noted that “[m]embers of the legal
profession today are highly mobile. Firm-switching is not uncommon.” 105 Therefore, finding new counsel would not be difficult. In
contrast, the court believed that “the public’s perception of the legal
profession is enhanced by what the Court admits is an appropriate,
albeit somewhat strict, application of the ethical rules in this sideswitching context.”106
B. Nullifying Counsel’s Opinion

The facts in Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg. Co. present an interesting remedy question from a conflict of interest.107 In Andrew, the
court threw out three opinions of non-infringement because the firm
that issued them was representing both Andrew and Beverly Manufacturing at the same time.
The Firm, which did not represent either party in the litigation,
had both Andrew and Beverly Manufacturing as clients.108 Two of

102. 432 F. Supp. 2d 461 (D. N.J. 2006).
103. Id. at 464 (citing Essex Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 993 F.
Supp. 241, 254 (D. N.J. 1998)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 415 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
108. Id. at 920-23.
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the attorneys at the Firm drafted two opinion letters for Beverly, both
concluding that Beverly did not infringe two of Andrew’s patents.109
The court determined that, based on these facts, the Firm “took
positions directly adverse to its client Andrew in the July and August
2003 opinion letters on behalf of its other client Beverly, without
obtaining informed consent from both Andrew and Beverly.”110 The
court found it irrelevant that no Firm lawyer worked on both Andrew
and Beverly cases, that there was no use of confidential information,
and that the Firm lawyers did not discuss their concurrent representation of Andrew and Beverly.111
With regards to the remedy, the court held “as a matter of law . . .
that the July and August 2003 opinion letters were not issued by
competent opinion counsel.”112 The court concluded that “no opinion
letter by Barnes & Thornburg while laboring under the unwaived
conflict of interest, should be used in any manner in this case.”
The court determined that it could impute the errors of the
attorneys on Beverly.113 The court also noted that there was no less
restrictive, adequate remedy available. 114 “If Beverly is allowed
to use the opinion letters at issue in this case, Andrew will suffer
because of [the Firm’s] breach of its ethical duty to Andrew. The public will also suffer if the opinion letters are used in these proceedings
because the opinion letters are the product of attorneys laboring under
an unwaived conflict of interest.”115
Furthermore, the court had the inherent power to judge the conduct of the Firm even if none of their attorneys were counsel of record
before the court.116 The court also determined, perhaps most importantly, that the conflict went to the heart of the competency of the
opinion letters.117 “The primary purpose of a client obtaining a patent
opinion letter from independent, objective and competent patent counsel is to ‘ensure that it acts with due diligence in avoiding activities
which infringe the patent rights of others,’” and the conflict of

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 924-25.
Id. at 928-29.
Id.
Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 927-28.

20

538

interest put this competency at risk.118 The Firm’s “conflict, which
arose from the concurrent representation of both Andrew and
Beverly, who were adverse to one another, prevents [the Firm] from
being able to provide the type of competent, independent advice and
opinion letters that the law requires. [the Firm’s] fiduciary duties to
Andrew prohibited it from taking any position adverse to Andrew.”119
CONCLUSION

Conflicts of interest can arise in various stages and aspects of patent
litigation. The recent cases discussed above provide examples of this.
And given the dramatic remedies that can result—from disqualification
to rejection of attorney work product—attorneys need to observe the relevant conflict of interest rules when engaging a client and while litigating
the case.

118. Id. at 928 (citing Comark Comm'n, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
119. Id.
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